

Linux rootkits & TTY Hijacking

Antonio Pérez Pérez <antonio.perez.perez@cern.ch>

CERN Computer Security Team

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Outline

Rootkits: Introduction

Linux rootkits

- History

- Detection and monitoring

- Removal

TTY Hijacking

- Introduction

- How it works

- What does it mean?

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Rootkits: Introduction

"A rootkit is a collection of tools (programs) that a hacker uses to mask intrusion and obtain administrator-level access to a computer or computer network" (whatis.com)

"Designed to hide or obscure the fact that a system has been compromised" (Wikipedia)

Set of software to maintain malicious access to a compromised host

Types:

- User mode
- Kernel mode
- Hypervisor level
- Firmware

Common functions:

Hide processes

Hide files

Hide network sockets

Backdoor

Keylogger

Linux rootkits

Overwrite system binaries/libraries

Change binaries (netstat, du, ping, lsof, ssh) or libraries (ld.so.preload, etc)

Kernel independent

Need to be compiled for the platform, easy to detect

How to detect: checking system binaries against trusted sources/instances

Kernel-mode rootkits

Malicious code is loaded directly in the kernel

Direct `/dev/{k,}mem` access (patch kernel on-the-fly)

Difficult to detect, usually includes backdoor features

LKM may be disabled, access to `/dev/{k,}mem` may be restricted

How to detect: search for known patterns, or known bugs

Flow of control on a system call:

1. An interrupt is triggered, and execution continues at the interrupt handler defined for that interrupt. On Linux, interrupt 80 is used

A rootkit could replace the kernel's interrupt handler by an own function. This requires a modification of the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)


2. The interrupt handler (`system_call()`) looks up the address of the requested syscall in the syscall table, and executes a jump to the respective address

A rootkit may (a) modify the interrupt handler to use a (rootkit-supplied) different syscall table, or (b) modify the entries in the syscall table to point to the rootkit's replacement functions

3. The syscall function is executed, and control returns to the application

A rootkit may overwrite the syscall function to place a jump to its own replacement function at the start of the syscall function

Kernel-mode rootkits



SucKIT

Presented in Phrack issue 58, 0x07

Fully working rootkit that is loaded through
`/dev/kmem`

No need for LKM support

Modifies the interrupt handler to use a (rootkit-supplied) different syscall table

Provides a password protected remote access connect-back shell initiated by a spoofed packet, and can hide processes, files and connections

New trends

Filesystem, network stack level rootkits

Often used as additional features

Hypervisor rootkits

The OS within the rootkit

Example: Subvirt

Debug Register based rootkits

Detection and monitoring

GREETINGS PROFESSOR FALKEN

HELLO

A STRANGE GAME.

THE ONLY WINNING MOVE IS
NOT TO PLAY.

HOW ABOUT A NICE GAME OF CHESS?

There is no unique (or simple/magic) solution:
combination of different tools

Monitoring filesystem binaries/libraries:

tripwire

rpm -V

...

Looking for known patterns or bugs:

rkhunter

chkrootkit

Samhain

...

Tripwire

Detects changes on the filesystem level

Scans the file system and stores information on each file scanned in a database. The results compared against the stored values in the database

rpm -V | --verify

Available on RPM-based distributions

Compares information about the installed files in the package with information about the files taken from the package metadata stored in the rpm database

rkhunter

Scans for rootkits, backdoors and local exploits by running tests like:

- MD5 hash compare
- Look for default files used by rootkits
- Wrong file permissions for binaries
- Look for suspected strings in LKM and KLD modules
- Look for hidden files
- Optional scan within plaintext and binary files

chrootkit

Tool to locally check for signs of a rootkit

Checks:

- system binaries for rootkit modification
- if the network interface is in promiscuous mode
- for lastlog, utmp and wtmp deletions
- signs of LKM trojans
- quick and dirty strings replacement.

samhaim

Provides file integrity checking and log file monitoring/analysis, as well as rootkit detection, port monitoring, detection of rogue SUID executables, and hidden processes

Usually there is no easy removal method



Clean reinstall is highly recommended!

TTY Hijacking


Way for an attacker to take over a user's session

Requires root privileges

Old known technique gaining more attention lately as it's getting added as feature on rootkits

1. Attaches to the victim's session
2. Redirects the `write()` system call to the attacker's code which logs the contents of the write if it is directed at the tty; it can then call the real `write()` system call
3. Profit!

How it works (cont.)



What does it mean?

If a rootkit implements TTY Hijacking features, all legitimate connections made on a compromised host can be intercepted by the attacker and act as a gateway to new hosts

Doesn't matter if the attacker doesn't have the user credentials on the remote hosts (password or ssh keys)

The session hijacking can be hidden completely to the victim

Mitigation?

TTY Hijacking on a compromised (rooted) host means you were already screwed from the beginning




Conclusions

Defending against rootkits is always an ongoing work. Rootkits are getting more and more sophisticated

There isn't a magic tool that detects everything. Use combination of them for better results

TTY Hijacking is “just” a feature added on rootkits. Mitigate the root of the problem



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Questions?