

Ursula Epting





09/16/10 EGI-InSPIRE RI-261323



Step 1 Acknowledge

2010-04-27 (timestamps UTC)


- 11:25 received alarm mail
- 11:36 sent Acknowledge, started investigation
 - call on internal team consisting of GridMiddleware -, PBS-, Unix/Linux-, Network experts and KIT-CERT for a meeting
 - until now Grid security coordination was not connected to KIT-CERT

Alarm



Involved Teams







Step 2 confirm incident

- 11:40 Look at traffic between given lps 192.108.46.24 (local NAT-GW address) and 195.140.243.2
- 11:44 found corresponding wn
- 11:47 found job running on wn
- 11:48 found user id patlas33
- 11:53 set wn offline for a real case mount home read-only to not disturb forensics!



- 12:03 saved home-directory of patlas33
- 12:05 stopped the Job, saved local information (processes, netstat,...)
 - Do not kill the job unless you have saved the home-dir!
- 12:22 found binary lutra_linux_64_rh5 with suspicious strings e.g. "Who shot the sheriff...", DN=/C=DE/ST=1337/L=H4x0rH0m3/O=I HaZ InternetZ/CN=Wunderbar Binary was deeply analyzed (see next talk)



- 12:56 Initial "Heads up" to csirt-list Warn other sites to minimize damage globally! Follow the IR procedure!
- 13:35 banned user locally Protect your resources!
- 13:39 Mail to Atlas-VO security list Get information about user from the VO!
- 14:07 Answer from VO-management:

*job submitted by DN xy, with link to job details



Step 5 respond

14:27 asked VO-admin to contact the user to verify job submission Misbehaving user or certificate compromised?

- 14:28 Analysis of Panda job information led to ui (difficult to understand Panda logs)
- 14:57 banned pilot job submitter (just to be sure :)



Step 5 respond

- 15:35 sent update to SSC4-CSIRT list, including analysis job binary, ui, in parallel ongoing netflow and binary analysis Keep others updated!
- 15:43 Mail to NIKHEF-CERT ui - compromised?
- 16:33 Atlas-VO-management confirmed job not compatible with VO-Policy => user globally banned from pilot-jobframework – protect others!





16:50 pilot job submitter unbanned19:58 reply from NIKHEF-CERT ~ "we will take care of the user and ui…"

End of first day...



During the next days 2010-04-28/29/30 we had more findings:

- job tried to install "at"-job
- user was also mapped to another local account atlas138
- globus-gridftp logs showed that file /etc/passwd of several nodes was read from another ui



- Updates sent to VO-admins and NIKHEF-CERT regarding gridftp-transfers of user
- Update sent to NIKHEF-CERT regarding the used ui
- Sent updates to the csirt-List about deeper analysis of the binary, netflow analysis
- Mail to user himself asked to verify job submission (no answer received...)



Step 10 Close incident

2010-05-03 15:00 Sent final report to SSC4-CSIRT-list

Lessons learnt

wins

- combination of experience of gridand cert-team
- team worked in one room, good communication
- improved internal procedures

fails

- NAT-Logs only held for short time
- no access for nongriddies but certmembers to the nodes
- little mess with timestamps on nodes and routers





Questions?

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